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Da’ish, Stasis and Bare Life in Iraq 
Introduction  
 
In tracing the roots and the emergence of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa-Sham 
(Da’ish) across Iraq in the summer of 2014, a story of marginalisation, demographic changes 
and geopolitical agendas is revealed. When combined, these stories explain why some 
individuals and communities declared bay’a (allegiance or following) to Da’ish, which allowed 
theo group to gain control over large parts of Syria and Iraq and declare a caliphate. Post-
2003, the Iraqi state underwent an existential transformation with the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein and the Ba’athist regime, along with experiencing a brutal manifestation of an al-Al 
Qa’ida franchise. Da’ish emerged out of the chaos and uncertainty of such post-invasion 
conditions, where sectarian violence had become prevalent, imbuing the country with a sense 
of inherent difference with violent characteristics. To understand the roots of Da’ish, this 
chapter considers political and demographic changes before the emergence of Da’ish 
focusing on the tensions between the oikos -(the family) – and polis (– the city).1 In the case 
of Iraq this tension is between the sectarian identities and state politics, which has often led 
to the exclusion of masses of people both during the Ba’ath period and post-2003 invasion. 
Thus leading to the emergence of bare life – a life form that, according to the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, is stripped from political agency, but that is still accountable 
to the state.2 Supplementing this is the concept of stasis - civil war - which helps to identify 
the tensions inherent within the state. Using Agamben’s concepts allows us to map out and 
better understand the contributing factors that lead to the rise of Da’ish, including political 
exclusion, sectarianism, and geopolitical agendas.   
 
This chapter begins by looking at narratives of exclusion during the early years of the Iraqi 
state before turning to the events of the 2003 invasion. It then considers demographic 
changes in Iraq, and how they are related to the sectarian divisions and the geopolitical 
agendas in Iraq. From this, a pattern emerges where Sunni communities were excluded from 
post-2003 Iraqi politics. It is in these conditions that Da’ish were able to gain supporters, from 
the de-politicisation of the political. Using concepts from Agamben’s canon of work on 
sovereignty, we are better placed to understand such processes. 
 
Bare Life and Stasis 
 
In an essay entitled, Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm, the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben bemoans the lack of theoretical development around the concept of civil war in the 
academy.3 Across 13 points – a style used by Agamben in other works – the essay explores 
the concept of civil war within Western political philosophy, suggesting that the necessity of 
civil war and of exclusion creates a secret solidarity, which he argues is central to his concept 
of bare life, a fundamental tension that is inherent within his political project. 
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Stasis, in Greek, is the concept of civil war which, for Agamben, remains a fundamental aspect 
of contemporary political life. Agamben’s work suggests that stasis emerges through tensions 
between the oikos -– the de-politicised family – and  polis – the political city – -  and from this, 
the oikos is seen to be “simultaneously the origin of division and stasis and the paradigm of 
reconciliation”.4 In this way, stasis 
 
constitutes a zone of indifference between the unpolitical space of the family and the political 
space of the city. In transgressing this threshold, the oikos is politicized; conversely, the polis 
is “economized,” that is, it is reduced to an oikos. This means that in the system of Greek 
politics civil war functions as a threshold of politicization and depoliticization, through which 
the house is exceeded in the city and the city is depoliticized in the family.5 
 
Understanding this relationship helps to reveal how stasis emerges, as a hidden paradigm 
within the relationship between oikos and polis. For Agamben, the oikos is the source of 
stasis, excluded from the city “through the production of a false fraternity”6 yet it does not 
solely reside within the oikos, as stasis is perhaps best seen in the collapse of the distinction 
between internal and external, friend and enemy, and oikos and polis; it is the politicisation 
of the oikos and the de-politicisation of the polis. The collapse of such distinctions reveals the 
complexity of contemporary political life amidst competing claims to power and legitimacy 
and efforts to regulate life. 
 
As Agamben later argues, “the civil war assimilates and makes undecidable brother and 
enemy, inside and outside, household and city. In the stasis, the killing of what is most 
intimate is indistinguishable from the killing of what is most foreign”.7 Opposition between 
oikos and polis is simultaneously an implication of the former in the latter amidst the conflict 
of “blood kinship”, which results in stasis. Those familiar with the work of Ibn Khaldun may 
note parallels with his work on asabyiyah, the development of kinship amongst communities 
as part of broader efforts to ensure survival. Such strategies are a regular feature of Middle 
Eastern state building efforts and the Iraqi case is no different, offering a devastating example 
of the tensions between oikos and polis amidst the evisceration of the sovereign project, of 
asabiyah.  The emergence of civil war -–  broadly driven by sectarian violence albeit couched 
in context specific contingency -–  reveals the evisceration and collapse of of blood kinship 
around sectarian, tribal and ethnic identities that are (not) the bearers of political meaning. 
We can then see that the oikos is contained within the polis through an exclusion and the 
politicisation of the oikos; meaning that stasis – a threshold of indifference between oikos 
and polis – is an inherent part of politics, amidst a struggle to politicise the oikos and 
depoliticise the polis within a zone of indistinction.  
 
To understand this in application, we must also briefly consider Agamben’s broader work on 
sovereignty. For Agamben, political power is biopolitical, seeking the regulation of life 
through the targeted governance techniques of the state. Essential to this is the 
establishment of a state of emergency and the creation of hominus sacri, the individual who 
can be killed but not sacrificed, simultaneously bound by the law yet receiving no protection.8 
Put another way, political meaning can be stripped from life as it is rendered natural, zoe, 
rather than of the Aristotelian good life, bios.  
 
In this view,  
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the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – 
gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and 
inside, bios and zoe, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once 
excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception 




Parallels with the distinction between oikos and polis are apparent, as the exclusive inclusion 
captures all within the governmental machinery of the state. Here, we see that political life is 
shaped by the inimitable struggle between oikos and polis, along with efforts to regulate life 
that transcend the political realm to be all encompassing. It is here that we see the emergence 
of stasis as an effort to regulate that which facilitates the emergence of politicisation and the 
move from oikos to polis, a movement that transgresses pure political issues.   
 
Although not without problems, particularly concerning the application of the ideas of stasis, 
bare life and state of exception to the Middle East, these are not insurmountable, as Mabon 
has argued elsewhere.10 Indeed, the Middle East provides fertile ground for consideration of 
the implications of such discussions. With this in mind, let us turn to a consideration of Iraqi 
politics, wherein we can see the creation of hominus sacri through the simultaneous exclusion 
and inclusion of life within political and legal spheres. Such exclusive inclusion has historically 
taken place along sectarian lines as a mechanism of control, where efforts to regulate life 
have separated oikos from polis. With this in mind, and beginning from the assumption that 
the citizens of Iraq constitute an oikos - a necessary but logical assumption - we proceed to 
explore the transgression of the zone of indistinction into stasis. 
 
Narratives of Exclusion  
 
Oh, if we can pull this thing off! Rope together the young hot-heads and the Shi’ah 
obscurantists, and the enthusiasts […] if we can make them work together and find their own 
salvation for themselves, what a fine thing it will be. I see visions and dream dreams.11. 
 
The story of the contemporary Iraqi state is one of exclusion and persecution. Amidst 
struggles to create a national project and to regulate life, the creation of narratives of 
belonging – coeval to which were narratives of exclusion – played a central role. The The 
severity of the problem facing Faisal, the first King of Iraq, was not lost on him, wrecounted 
as presented anecdotally by T.E. Lawrence: 
There is still – and I say this with a heart full of sorrow – no Iraqi people but unimaginable 
masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and 
absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually 
ready to rise against any government whatsoever.12 
The existence of myriad peoples within spatial borders posed serious challenges for those 
wishing to establish biolpolitical control. Some such as Adham Saouli13 suggest that divisions 
that began to characterise the Iraqi state were a consequence of the failure of the state-
building project. In contrast, a different position argues that the manifestation of sectarian 
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violence is a consequence of socio-economic factors, contingent upon time and space which 
requires the development of an ‘other’ to oppose the nationalist project. If one considers the 
writings of Gertrude Bell, the intrepid British explorer and political advisor, it is easy to see 
how perceptions of the other and ideas of external interference that are imbued in othering 
shaped decisions at the time:   
 
The proximity of Persia and the existence in Mesopotamia of Karbala and Najaf, two of the 
most holy shrines of the Shiah sect, to which the Persians belong, with the resulting influx of 
Persian pilgrims, have brought the country much under Persian influences. Nomad Arabia 
belongs wholly to the Sunni half of Islam, yet the tribes settled in Mesopotamia have 
embraced, almost without exception, the Shiah faith.14  
 
From the establishment of the state until 2003, sectarian difference was propagated as a 
mechanism of survival, seeking to curtail the power of the Shi’a clerics and ensuring the 
survival of successive regimes.15 Across the state building process, political rule has been 
facilitated and characterised by sectarian difference which has become a prominent feature 
of political, economic and social life. With the establishment of the British Mandate in 1921, 
political life across Iraq was defined by efforts to regulate life and to maintain power. A year 
previously, a nationalist revolt took place across the country, resulting in the deaths of over 
300 British and Indian soldiers and a further 1200 wounded, costing the British Exchequer 
around £40,000,000. As a consequence of their acquiescence, the British rewarded powerful 
Sunnis in Baghdad with prominent political positions, in doing so institutionalising the 
sectarian schism that would define Iraqi politics until 2003. 
 
Yet sectarianism need not have necessarily become such a feature of political life. In the years 
prior to the formation of the state, a number of nationalist organisations were established 
across southern Iraq that drew upon religious figures and political activists from both Sunni 
and Shi’a constituencies, yet in the years that followed, organisations would take on an 
explicitly sectarian dimension. Writing at the time, Gertrude Bell stressed the unity of such 
groups, where “the nationalists had picked up their tempo in continual meetings at the 
mosques. Extremists are calling for independence and refuse moderation and these have 
dominated the mob in the name of Islamic unity and the rights of the Arabs.”16   
 
Following the British embrace of the Sunni bourgeoisie, sectarian difference became a 
prominent feature of the nascent Iraqi state. As Adeed Dawisha outlines 
no Shi’ite was accepted in the military college or in the bureaucracy, except on very rare 
occasions. There were all kinds of hurdles preventing Shi’ites from even entering high schools. 
The State did not think of the Shi’ite community as part of it, and the Shi’ites did not consider 
themselves to be part of the state.17  
Such processes continued as the state developed. 
With the establishment of the Ba’ath rule in 1958, Sunni positions of power were 
strengthened, particularly after the emergence of Saddam Hussein, whose brutal rule was 
held together by a strong nationalist presence: staunchly Sunni, with his Tikriti tribal group a 
central part of his political vision. To ensure his survival, as Charles Tripp notes, political 
 
processes were designed to retain power and exacerbating difference as a mechanism of 
control.18  
In an effort to retain power, Saddam mobilized networks of patronage to bring peripheral 
actors into the political fray, transforming local interests by allying them alongside burgeoning 
national interests.19 The transformation of Iraq in the following decades required migration 
from rural to urban environments, changing the demographics of city life, emerging from the 
abolition of the 1933 Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators.20 Although explicitly 
Sunni, the Ba’ath project positioned itself against “religious sectarianism (al-ta’ifiyya), racism, 
and tribalism (al-qabaliyya),”21 yet in reality, life across Iraq was dramatically different. Key 
ministries were dominated by Sunnis, who made up 70% of the army after the 1958 coup, 
whilst the rest was comprised of 20% Shi’a and 10% Kurds and other minorities.22   
 
Whilst opposition groups emerged in opposition to the Ba’ath regime, they faced serious 
challenges.23 Al Da’awa al Islamiyah and Al Mujahidin drew support from a wide range of 
Shi’a groups, the former from Shi’a clerics and those marginalized from political life,24 whilst 
the latter from religious graduates from Iraqi schools. Both drew inspiration from the teaching 
of Muhammad Baqir al-Al Sadr, who was later executed by Saddam in an attempt to crush 
the burgeoning Shi’a movements. The execution of aAl- Sadr fed into Shi’a myths and 
narratives of resistance, guilt and martyrdom found in the Karbala narrative,25 whilst also 
positioning the al-Al Sadr as one of the most influential political families in Iraq. An additional 
consequence of this was to help the Sadr family challenge the  “‘quietist ayatollahs”’26 who 
had occupied a central position in Shi’a life across Iraq.  
 
Although a prominent Shi’a figure, Muhammad Baqir al-Al Sadr had rejected the sectarian 
divisions that had plagued Iraq since its formation. Writing from his cell in Baghdad, al-Al Sadr 
called for unity amongst the Iraqi people: 
Oh my dear people, I turn to you all, Sunnites and Shi’ites, Arabs and Kurds, in this 
crucial moment of crisis and jihad [...] since the crisis is that of the whole Iraqi people, 
the brave response and struggle must also become the reality of the whole Iraqi 
people. Thus I am with you, my Sunni brother and son, just as much as I am with you, 
my Shi‘i brother and son [...] Oh my sons and brothers, the sons of Mosul and Basra, 
the sons of Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf [...] [unite in order to] build a free, glorious 
Iraq [...] where citizens of all nationalities and schools of thought would feel that they 
are brothers and would all contribute to the leadership of their country.27 
Saddam’s crackdowns on Shi’a groups forced many into Iran, where the newly formed Islamic 
Republic helped establish new groups such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in an attempt to export the revolutionary goals of the Islamic Republic across the Muslim 
world. 28  
 
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, many shared Gertrude Bell’s concerns from 60 years 
previously, that the long-marginalized Shi’a groups across Iraq would support their co-





The ruling clique in Iran persists in using the face of religion to foment sedition and 
division among the ranks of the Arab nation despite the difficult circumstances 
through which the Arab nation is passing. The invocation of religion is only a mask to 
cover Persian racism and a buried resentment of the Arabs.29 
After the war, unrest continued across the southern parts of Iraq, drawing support from a 
range of upon Shi’a groups, and disaffected soldiers and deserters. In response, Saddam 
responded with force, committing atrocities ‘on a predictably massive scale’ resulting in huge 
numbers of internally displaced people and refugees, whilst feeding deep-seated grievances 
amongst Shi’a communities.30  
When US led forces toppled the Ba’athist regime in March 2003, latent structural grievances 
that had lain dormant since the establishment of the Iraqi state manifested in violence across 
the state as Iraq rapidly descended into the stasis of civil war.31 In the years that followed, 
Shi’a groups became increasingly influential as nationalist identity was superseded in the 
political arena by sectarian allegiance. In areas facing serious socio-economic challenges, 
populist groups emerged, coalescing around figures who were able to draw legitimacy from 
family lineages, such as Muqtada al-Al Sadr, who espoused vehemently sectarian narratives 
that undermined (often token) attempts to retain nationalist unity by regimes in Baghdad. 32  
 
Shi’a clerics across the south of the state took on an important guidance role. Although 
typically viewed as “‘quietist”’, clerics such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani became incredibly 
influential, seeking to transcend sectarian difference. Yet fatwas calling for jihad against 
Da’ish would later be viewed as inciting violence against Sunnis. In spite of this perception, 
Sistani sought to circumvent such tensions, urging Shi’a not to “call Sunnis our brothers, call 
them ourselves”. At this point, the melange of identities operating across Iraq restricted the 
space for opposition identities to act. The various political, social and religious sub-state 
groups across Iraq – defined along tribal, ethnic or sectarian lines, where class cut across all – 
was described by Fanar Haddad as “‘the mutually antagonistic other of national identity”’.33 
 
Simultaneously, al-Al Qa’ida in Iraq had become an important actor in the sectarian conflict. 
Prior to the 2003 invasion, a Jordan Salafi named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had entered Iraq to 
fight along Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan but when the war escalated in 2004 he and his 
organization declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Later, going against the wishes of Bin 
Laden, Zarqawi declared full out war against the Shi’a population with the intention of 
exacerbating the sectarian conflict in the hope that the Iraqi state would crumble, 
exacerbating sectarian divisions.34  
  
Despite al-Al Qa’ida in Iraq’s desire to dominate the insurgent groups, there was a reversal in 
public support that ended in the Anbar Awakening where a coalition of Sunni tribes was 
brought together and funded by the US military in an attempt to empower Sunnis in the fight 
against al- Al Qa’ida. At first, the Anbar Awakening empowered Sunnis, however the 
aftermath quickly soured when the government in Baghdad failed to bring the leaders of the 
movement into the state infrastructures and providing the region with sufficient resources 
and security, fueling Sunni grievances towards the Shi’a led government.35 
 
 
In such an environment, political space for Sunnis was restricted as they were caught between 
the government of Nouri al-Al Maliki, Shi’a militias, al-Al Qa’ida and US-led coalition forces. 
An International Crisis Group report documents the challenges facing young Sunnis, who 
“share the concerns of all young Iraqis, as they see the government operating in slow motion 
only. But, beyond that, they also feel that they do not enjoy the same opportunities as others. 
They have yet to feel accepted by society and resent being suspected of affiliation with al-
Qaeda.”36   
 
Such perceptions were shaped by broader Iraqi political discourse and policies. As Mabon and 
Royle note, the Maliki and Abadi governments were characterised by marginalisation, 
discrimination and exclusion, albeit in different forms. The Maliki regime deployed a “‘top 
down”’, approach to cultivating sectarian difference whilst the Abadi government sought to 
remove such sectarian tensions, although the repercussions of Maliki’s policies continue to 
be felt through the cultivation of sectarian difference within institutions and across socio-
economic communities. As time went on, the struggle to find an outlet for grievances or 
political leadership became an increasingly important issue –- even after the destruction of 
the caliphate – feeding into the growth of deep structural grievances. 
 
Demographic changes, Oikos, Sect and the Geopolitical Allegiance 
 
Conflicting political agendas between state and family created divisions across society that 
led to entrenched divisions across all aspects of the state. Amidst such existential concerns, 
the inclusion of one group in politics has resulted in the exclusion of another group. These 
structures have changed over time, firstly benefiting the Arab Sunnis during Saddam’s regime 
while the Shi’a and Kurds faced violent discrimination and marginalisation whilst after the 
2003 invasion the tables were turned and the Arab Sunnis became marginalised.   
 
The tension that built up in Iraq between the different groups escalated over time, eventually 
leading to stasis. During Saddam’s rule, conflicting ideas and political dissent were suppressed 
or pushed to the periphery, perhaps best seen in the Shi’a insurgency in rural areas across 
southern Iraq, but has since escalated and now includes the indistinction of the rural and the 
city, the friend and the enemy; it is all encompassing.   
 
During the Ba’athist rule the political arena was shaped by interactions between the centre 
and the periphery. Although the rural population has dwindled over the last century the Iraqi 
state was never strong enough to maintain control over the peripheral regions.37 
Consequently, Saddam utilised his networks of patronage to maintain order in the peripheries 
though a carrot-and-stick system where supportive tribes was rewarded for their loyalty and 
disloyalty was punished by death, violence and torture.38 This meant that Saddam could 
retain control over exterior Iraq with minimal intervention. However, it also meant that the 
collective identity creation of Iraq was placed on hold and the tribal and religious values were 
given space to continue in the peripheries.  
 
During Saddam’s rule, tribes provided security and justice within their own vicinities and 
collected tax on behalf of the state, even in Kurdish and predominantly Shia Muslim areas 
 
after the First Gulf War.39 However, autonomy state authority remained limited in the 
peripheries, resulting in competing forms of governance. For example, the population in the 
south, including Shi’a and Arab Sunni, were only allowed to settle civil cases while in Anbar 
they were permitted to settle murder cases, revealing the complexity and difference of 
governance and legal structures.40  
 
Saddam also harnessed different identities to keep a hold over the population including tribal 
values, Arab nationalism, and Ba’athist ideology. During the Iran-Iraq war when Iran pledged 
support to Shi’a insurgents in Iraq, Saddam used the banner of Arabism to urge the Arab Shi’a 
to remain loyal to their ethnic kin, even if that meant even further alienate the Kurds.41 Other 
individuals who were not regarded Arab but rather “‘Iranian nationals”’ or Persians in Iraq 
became further marginalised and racism became commonplace. The dismay increased 
further when 35,000 people allegedly of Iranian descent were expelled to Iran and Iraq’s most 
influential Shi’a cleric -– Muhammad Baqir al-Al Sadr -– was executed in 1980.42 In spite of al-
Al Sadr’s pleas to the contrary, sectarian divisions increased during this period and 
geopolitical actors in Tehran and Riyadh sought to support their kin in Iraq thus further 
fragmenting the political order.  
 
The political climate changed after First Gulf War when Saddam changed tactics in order to 
maintain power. After the war, Saddam took the decision to dry out the Mesopotamian 
marshes in southern Iraq in order to punish the Marsh Arab Tribes that had risen against him 
during the war, whilst also depriving the Shi’a opposition of its base of operations.43 This large 
project required canals to re-divert the river, internally displacing between 100-200,000 
people and creating more that 100 000 international refugees, most of whom crossed the 
border into Iran.44 This case in particular reveals the tension between the oikos and the polis 
in the periphery, as a consequence of Saddam’s retribution against tribal and sectarian 
division, displacing thousands in the process. 
 
In urban spaces, governmental machinery helped regulate the Iraqi state, although it was not 
without challenges. During this period, urban spaces expanded dramatically, with 19 million 
living under Baghdad’s control45 and over 55% living in impoverished conditions.46 
Furthermore, with the Ba’ath party being the largest employer having ownership of the public 
sector, the Arab Sunni was given preferential treatment whilst Shi’a and Kurds were 
marginalised from public employment.47 The impact of reciprocal exclusion and 
marginalization was largely overlooked in the aftermath of 2003, when the political arena 
changed. Such events reveal tensions in both the oikos and polis, particularly when the politics 
of the sovereign state is coterminous with tribal and sectarian politics. 
 
The collapse of Saddam’s regime allowed previously marginalized actors to lay claim to 
power. Consequently, the Iraqi Governing Council openly declared sect and ethnicity to be 
primary principles for political organization. Shi’a and Kurdish leaders believed that that the 
new Iraq should reflect the demographic organization of the population, which would 
increase their power across regions and the state itself. However, Sunni Arabs argued that 
this was an American strategy playing into a policy of divide and rule that would ultimately 
result in sectarian conflicts.48  
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The changing political arena divided political opinions and many Sunni Arabs argued that the 
de-Bba’athification process -– later described as one of the biggest mistakes made by 
American and British strategists -– was in fact de-Ssunnification aimed at excluding them from 
power. This was exacerbated by the fact that US brought Shi’a and Kurdish groups into 
negotiations, while Sunni Arab groups were looked at with suspicion and largely placed on 
the peripheral rejected from the political centre.49 In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, a 
new form of stasis emerged.  
  
In the vacuum that emerged, previously marginalized communities sought to exert revenge 
on the state that had previously regulated all aspects of their lives. In this context, Sunni Arabs 
became economically and politically marginalised, leading to conditions in which individuals 
were forced to turn to a range groups such as Da’ish for survival without necessarily sharing 
their ideological vision.50 Adding to this, many of the 35, 000 prisoners imprisoned by Saddam 
resorted to crime after their release, resulting in gangs looting army storage facilities which 
were later sold on the black market.51 In the meantime, thousands of Iraqis, many of them 
civilians, were imprisoned and subjected to inhumane treatment in the Abu Ghraib and other 
prisons, fuelling Sunni grievances.52 
   
At this point, sectarian violence became an almost defining feature of Iraqi politics. Amidst 
pressure from formal government structures and informal Shi’a militias, Sunni groups faced 
seemingly existential challenges for survival. As Mabon and Royle document in The Origins of 
ISIS, the impact on human agency at this time was particularly devastating, especially for 
Sunnis who were trapped between the Shi’a led government, Shi’a militias, a violent al-Al 
Qa’ida franchise, and coalition forces.53 Moreover, at this point, Shi’a militias were able to 
execute violence on Sunnis across Iraq, seemingly with impunity, leaving Sunnis bound by 
state law yet abandoned by it in a living example of Agamben’s homo sacer.  
 
Consequently, during this period the tribe became even more important for the Sunni Arab 
tribe members, not just in the political arena but also for survival. During the de-
Bba’athification around 300, 000 people previously employed in by the Ba’athist state 
struggled to find work and protection for their families,54 including doctors and teachers. 
55With the tables turned employment in the public sector remained high at approximately 
30%,56 with Shi’a holding many of the positions using the ministers to serve the tribe and the 
tribal leaders rather than the state of Iraq. As a result, Sunni Arabs was caught between the 
Shi’a government in Baghdad, Shi’a militias and aAl-Qa’ieda.57 
  
The destabilisation of Baghdad led the US military build sections concrete partitioning walls 
to divide the communities and imposed check points, buffer zones, collective punishments, 
impersonating of suspect relatives, mass incarcerations without trial and bulldozing 
landscapes believed to be harbouring the enemy.58 In Baghdad, the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-
Al Sadr revived Mahdi Army, an explicitly Shi’a militia which regulated life across the poorer 
parts of the city, imbuing such areas with an almost militant sense of Shi’s community, helped 
by his family’s clerical heritage. 
   
Simultaneously, al-Al Qa’ieda adopted strategies to target Shi’a communities, symbols, holy 
places and leaders. Their aim was to exacerbate the sectarian conflict with Shi’ites that would 
lead to the collapse of the state amidst the violent rejection of the Shi’a -– both Iraqi and 
 
Iranian -– albeit acting in direct contravention of the messages of both Osama bin Laden and 
Ayman al-Al Zawahiri.59 Their tactics included mass casualties suicide bombings, kidnappings 
and beheading of hostages. Increasingly, the Shi’a population was killed or displaced form 
Sunni majority or mixed population areas.60 By the end of the 2000s tens of thousands of 
Iraqis had been killed during the civil war. Al-Al Qa’ieda and other Sunni insurgent groups 
controlled the western and northern parts of Iraq, while Mahdi Army controlled large areas 
of Baghdad and had strong political associations to the south.  
 
Within the context of the disintegration of the Iraqi state, the ability of Baghdad to exert its 
control over Iraqi territory greatly diminished, creating opportunities for new actors to 
emerge. At the heart of the growing sectarian divisions of the Iraqi state lies the infiltration 
of the state by external geopolitical agendas. Since the 1979 revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran have been caught in a rivalry that is increasingly framed along sectarian lines but is 
predominantly geopolitical in nature, resulting in the emergence of spaces of competition 
across the Middle East. In Iraq, the two actors have been keen to support their kin and the 
fragmentation of Iraq has meant that Riyadh and Tehran has been able to exacerbate the 
conflicts between the communities.61 Iran in particular wanted to influence the Shi’a in the 
south to gain access to the holy cities of Karbala and Najaf. 
  
One example of this is Iranian financial support to Shi’a militias across the state, with whom 
Iran has strong ties having especially the Badr Brigades which has been regarded as an Iranian 
puppet and viewed as an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.62 The Badr 
Brigades provided security in Shi’a and mixed areas in Baghdad, including patrolling and 
creating checkpoints.63 Further alienating the Sunni population in the city. The Arab Sunni 
communities, which are heterogeneous, were now viewed as either Ba’athist or terrorists and 
they were readily targeted by Badr Brigade and other militias. The reinforcement of the 
sectarian divisions by geopolitical actors has been devastating in the fragmentation of the 
Iraqi state, especially in the marginalisation and exclusion of the Sunni Arab communities.  
 
Saudi policy at this time was driven by long-standing concerns at expansionist Iranian activity 
on its northern border. US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks details document the fears 
of many in the Kingdom. One cable from 2009 denotes the lack of confidence in Iraqi political 
leaders: 
 
The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador 
(Fraker) is well aware of my views.” […] For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. 
“I don’t trust this man,” the King stated, He’s an Iranian agent.” […] Maliki has “opened the 
door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power, the King said.64 
 
A year earlier, the Saudi leadership had urged the US to undertake a military strike against 
Iran to curtail both its nuclear programme and its perceived nefarious activities across the 
region: 
 
the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear 
weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', 
adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for 
the King and his government.65 
 
Formatted: Font color: Auto
 
These fears were also echoed by King Hamad of Bahrain who stated that “as long as Khamenei 
has the title of Commander-in-Chief, Bahrain must worry about the loyalty of Shia who 
maintain ties and allegiance to Iran”.66 Such comments were underpinned by what King 
Abdullah of Jordan referred to as a “‘Shi’a Crescent”’, which came to be the dominant lens 
through which to view Iranian activity and aspirations across the region. It is in this climate 
that the broader categories of Sunni and Shi’a become conflated with the geopolitical 
aspirations of political actors across the Middle East.67 
 
In later years, Saudi policy towards Iraq would dramatically shift. The Saudi embassy in 
Baghdad was re-opened in 2016 after a 25-year closure. Riyadh also sought to counter Iranian 
influence by speaking to Shi’a militias led by Muqtada al-Al Sadr, who visited the Kingdom in 
2017, in an effort to capitalise on a rising Iraqi nationalism that seemed at odds with the 
Khomeini’s vision of veleyat-e faqi. Yet in spite of rumours of a burgeoning rapprochement, 
al-Al Sadr continued to side with Iran after the 2018 elections. 
 
Whilst the importance of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran should not be ignored, it 
should not be overstated. Three different positions on the rivalry have emerged in recent 
years. The first suggests that this is a political struggle whilst the second argues that it is 
primarily a consequence of sectarian difference. The third, which we subscribe to, is that 
politics and religion interact with one another in different forms, shaped by the interaction 
of context specific contingent factors with broader regional trends. It is this view that helps 
us to understand the construction of Iraqi politics and ultimately, stasis. how  
 
Da’ish, Stasis and bare life in Iraq 
 
The emergence of Da’ish is a consequence of the cultivation of bare life across Iraq. Put 
another way in explicitly Agambenian terms, the politicisation of the oikos within the polis 
and collapse of both blood kinship and political kinship amidst the depoliticisation of the polis 
facilitated a zone of indistinction from which violence emerges. Through exclusion, 
marginalization and persecution, Sunnis across Iraq felt a sense of abandonment, lacking 
political and existential protection as a consequence of both Iraqi and regional machinations. 
As Agamben suggests, stasis is inherent within the fabric of the state, emerging amidst efforts 
to (de)politicize events and people in the struggle to regulate life. This struggle has 
characterised Iraq from the establishment of the British mandate to the Prime Ministership 
of Haider al-Al Abadi, who continues to challenge the inherent sectarianism that continues to 
shape structural factors within Iraqi politics.  
 
Addressing such structural factors is an essential part of preventing the emergence of future 
instances of stasis and future incarnations of violent Sunni extremism. In spite of this 
aspiration, Agamben suggests that it is an inevitable aspect of political organisation. Such a 
negative view of politics and human agency is a regular feature of Agamben’s work, yet we 
should not be too quick to ignore the power of agency. As the likes of Patricia Owens have 
suggested, agency can be expressed in myriad forms and contexts, even within bare life.  
 
Commented [JE3]: This sentence needs finishing 
 
Although deeply pessimistic, Agamben suggests that stasis can be avoided through recourse 
to the oikos and the development of a truce between competing visions of the political. It is 
only through truly understanding the relationship between the politicised and the 
depoliticised, the oikos and polis that we are able to work towards preventing the emergence 
of stasis. 
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